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Dobson: Search by Private Persons: State v. Long

SEARCH BY PRIVATE PERSONS: STATE V.
LONG
Edward MacDonald Dobson
"Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted
authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity?"'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Montana Supreme Court abandoned thirty years of case
law in State v. Long.2 The court held that Montana's constitutional right of privacy, article II, section 10, protects Montanans
only from invasions by the state. Whether perpetrated by a trespassing neighbor or a company security guard, invasions by private
individuals are no longer subject to constitutional sanctions, but
only to common law tort actions. In Long, the court allowed the
admission of criminal evidence uncovered by an illegal act of a private citizen. Formerly, in Montana, courts treated evidence taken
illegally by a private citizen as they treated evidence taken illegally
by the state: both were excluded from the criminal trial under the
exclusionary rule. This note examines the right of privacy in criminal law and criticizes the new direction taken by the Montana Supreme Court in Long.
II.

A.

STATE

v. LONG

Facts and Record

Charles and Vicky Long rented a house in Huntley, Montana,
from Millard Hultgren, who lived on the same property in a second
house about twenty-five yards away. There was no written rental
agreement. The Longs had rented from Hultgren for four years
without incident.
On August 4, 1983, Hultgren entered the Longs' home to investigate why a light was on. Hultgren was a trespasser.3 In the
house, Hultgren "discovered a 'grow light' shining on what was
later determined to be 657 marijuana plants."'4 Hultgren reported
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 220 (1890); see
also infra text accompanying note 111.
Mont. -, 700 P.2d 153 (1985); see Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 523, 241
2. __
P.2d 816, 819 (1952).
3. Id. at __,
700 P.2d at 158.
, 700 P.2d at 154.
4. Id. at
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this to the Yellowstone County Sheriff's Office. An application for
a search warrant was prepared, based solely on Hultgren's statement. The warrant was issued and the marijuana plants were
seized. At a later hearing, the Longs moved to suppress the evidence gathered by Hultgren. They argued that since the application for the search warrant rested on probable cause derived from
the trespass-an unlawful search-their constitutional right of privacy had been violated.
The application for the search warrant indicated that Hultgren may have had suspicions of drug trafficking in the month
before the unlawful entry:
Hultgren recalled that a van with Texas license plates had
been parked in front of the Long residence for about three weeks
last month. He also said that the rent paid in July and due on the
15th of the month was paid with a money order from Texas. The
rent has never previously been paid in that manner.
Hultgren stated7 that Charles Long has not worked in approximately 1 1/2 years.
The defense ignored the opportunity to question Hultgren's motives and concentrated instead on Hultgren's trespass.'
B.

The District Court's Order and Memorandum

The district court determined that Montana's constitutional
right of privacy protected the Longs against admission of evidence
resulting from Hultgren's trespass: "The defendant contends that
• . . [suppression of the evidence] is required in view of the decisions in State v. Hyem . . . and State v. Van Haele. . .. Unfortunately, that appears to be the case. ' The court cited Hyem1 ° and
Van Haele1 as holding that "individuals other than state agents
could never be in a position of showing a compelling state interest,
and therefore infringement of the privacy right could never be justified where a search was conducted by a private citizen. ' 12 As a
private citizen, then, Hultgren had no compelling state interest.
The court could neither justify nor excuse Hultgren's trespass. It
5. See State v. Long, No. 83-233, Application for Search Warrant (13th Dist. 1983).
6. See Long, No. 83-233, Motion to Suppress and Record of Hearing on Motion to
Suppress.
7. Long, No. 83-233, Application for Search Warrant. See also infra text accompanying note 109.
8. See generally Long, No. 83-233, Record.
9. See Long No. 83-233, District Court Memorandum at 3.
10. State v. Hyem, - Mont. -, 630 P.2d 202 (1981).
11. State v. Van Haele, 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311 (1982).
12. Long, No. 83-233, District Court Memorandum at 3.
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could not admit the tainted evidence if Hultgren violated the
Longs' right of privacy. 13
The district court observed that "what appears certain is that
enforcement of the criminal law is not a compelling state interest
where the private citizen is concerned.

' 14

If this is so, then "the

law of this State distinguishes between classes of violators insofar
as the exception to the right of privacy is concerned." 15 In other
words, the state may invade the constitutional right of privacy if it
has a compelling state interest,1 6 but a private citizen cannot, because a private citizen cannot show a compelling state interest
even if he acts in good faith.1 7 The district court found it illogical
that the Montana Supreme Court did not distinguish between the
state and the private citizen as violators of the constitutional right
of privacy, but did distinguish between them when applying the
exception.

8

On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court had two options other
than affirmance. First, it could have carved a good faith exception
and held that a citizen can show a compelling state interest in the
enforcement of the criminal law. For example, in Long, prevention
of the production and sale of a controlled substance would override
the wrong of an unknowing trespass. The embattled exclusionary
..
rule would not be invoked, and a trial would be had.
Second, the court could have held that the Montana Constitution does not protect Montanans against invasions of privacy by
other private citizens. The court chose the latter route and held
that Montana's constitutional right of privacy applies only to invasions by the state, not to trespassers or to other invasions by private persons. By avoiding the issue of whether a private citizen can
show a compelling state interest, the court also avoided construing
the right of privacy to require the exclusion of evidence taken by
13. A "compelling state interest exists where the state enforces its criminal laws for
the benefit and protection of other fundamental rights of its citizens." State ex rel. Zander
v. District Court, 180 Mont. 548, 556, 591 P.2d 656, 660 (1979). Since the benefit runs to the
citizens, it seems logical that a citizen assisting in the enforcement of the criminal laws
could show a compelling state interest. See also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
14. Long, No. 83-233, District Court Memorandum at 4.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 13.
17.
See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv. Reg.,
-- Mont. .
634 P.2d 181, 188 (1981) ("Showing a compelling state interest is an
equal protection test, and it comes into play if the statute or state constitution affects a
fundamental right.").
18. See Long, No. 83-233, District Court Memorandum at 4 ("As illogical as this situation appears, such is the law, and this court is compelled to follow it.").
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private persons acting in a public capacity.1 9
C. Justice Morrison's Approach
Writing for the majority in Long, Justice Morrison reduced
the right of privacy to a common law right, arguing that constitutional provisions apply only to governmental actions, not to the
acts of other persons, unless the "constitutional language itself has
specifically addressed private action." He cited the individual dignity provision of the Montana Constitution as an example of such
a specification: "Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights .
"..
20 He invoked this argument as a traditional notion of constitutional principles. The
argument was inappropriate in Long.

III.

THE COURT'S REASONING

This section examines the two principal theories on which the
court decided Long. First is Justice Morrison's traditional notion
of constitutional construction. The second is the admission of evidence illegally acquired by private citizens.
A.

The Traditional Notion Theory: Expressio Universalis est
Exclusio Populus2 1

Justice Morrison relied heavily on "traditional notions of constitutional principles. ' 22 "Unless specifically provided otherwise,
citizens' rights articulated in the Constitution proscribed only state
action; therefore, if a private citizen invaded the privacy of another
citizen, there was no violation of the Constitution itself. ' 23 Although the individual dignity provision of the Montana Constitution specifically proscribes the actions of private citizens, Justice
Morrison's argument fails to allow for the adoption of general constitutional language that simply makes explicit an implied constitutional right developed in prior case law. This was the situation in
Montana after State v. Brecht, where the Montana Supreme Court
held the constitutional right of privacy to apply between private
19. See, e.g., People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 367-68, 594 P.2d 1000, 1006-07, 155
Cal. Rptr. 575, 581-82 (1979).
20. MONT.CONST. art. II, § 4.
21. Loosely translated, the generality does not apply to the people; this is a parody of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that the expression of one thing excludes another,
which the court in Long attempts to follow. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
22. Long, - Mont. at -,
700 P.2d at 156.
23. Id.
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persons."' In 1972, the Montana Constitutional Convention
25
adopted Brecht as the law of the state.
Curiously, Justice Morrison may have been aware of this problem, as he attempted to show that the constitutional convention
did not purport to adopt the prior case law.2 6 If Justice Morrison's
position regarding the constitutional convention is discredited, the
question of whether the general provision adopts the prior case law
must be answered.
In Long, the court ignored not only the constitutional convention's written and oral references to existing case law, but also the
convention's deletion of the modifying phrase, "the state. 27 Incredibly, the court found that there was "every indication that the
delegates themselves adopted a privacy section which would only
proscribe state action,' 28 by citing convention transcript language
on how the provision does apply to the state." This seems to result
from an incomplete reading of the transcripts. The attitude of the
convention was best revealed when the delegates voted overwhelmingly to delete the exception, thus preventing even the state from
overcoming the privacy right by showing a compelling state inter24. See State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 270-72, 485 P.2d 47, 51 (1971).
25. The following written comments of the Bill of Rights Committee were among
those circulated to all delegates on the convention floor:
What it [the new privacy provision] accomplishes is the elevation of the judiciallyannounced right of privacy to explicit constitutional status. The right has been
guaranteed in case law at the federal level (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)) and in Montana (Brecht, 28 St. Rep. 468, 473 (May 1971)).
II MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972 at 632 (1979). In Brecht, the court held
the constitutional right of privacy to apply between private persons. Bill of Rights Committee chairman Wade Dahood told the convention delegates, in floor debate, that his committee "notes that the highest court in Montana has in several decisions recognized a broad
right of privacy. . .. The committee in no way intends to overturn these decisions which
establish so important a right." VII MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972 at
2484 (1981).
26. See Long, Mont. at , 700 P.2d at 157.
27. On February 3, 1972, the Montana Constitutional Convention's Bill of Rights
Committee held a hearing on Amended Delegate Proposal No. 33: "The right of privacy
being essential to the well-being of a free society, the state shall not infringe upon this right
without the showing of a compelling state interest." See Amended Delegate Proposal No. 33,
Bill of Rights Committee Hearing File; cf. I MONTANA CONSTrruTIONAL CONVENTION 19711972 at 127, Delegate Proposal No. 33 (1979) (emphasis added). After the hearing, the reference to "the state" was deleted: "The right of privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." II
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972 at 632 (1979) (emphasis added). Only one
purpose justifies the deletion: the right of privacy is constitutionally protected against invasions other than those of the state.
28. Long, - Mont. at __,
700 P.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
29. See id.; cf. infra text accompanying notes 45-46; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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est.30 The exception was restored merely to allow some balancing
of private and public interests.3 '
This "traditional notion" of constitutional construction would
not be limited to the privacy section. Under Justice Morrison's
test, Montana's right "to a clean and healthful environment"
might be enforceable only against state action, since the inalienable rights provision of the Montana Constitution does not specifically include language applying it to private citizens.3 2 But the inalienable rights provision has language implying its application to
private citizens as well as to the state: "In enjoying these rights, all
persons recognize corresponding responsibilities. 3 3 At a minimum,
the court could broaden the "traditional notion" test to encompass
such language and to recognize an express adoption of prior case
law as indicated in the record of constitutional intent.
The problematic traditional notion is not universally shared
and has not confounded other state courts. Prior to Long, Montana
was one of many states applying constitutional protections to private actions, despite the absence of the specificity that the court in
Long found so necessary. For example, Washington 4 and New
Jersey35 have barred private restrictions on speech in places open
to the public. Ohio has barred certain private restrictions on
speech.3 6 New York has applied due process to the private sale of
property.3 7 Most significantly, California has applied the right of
privacy to searches by private security personnel, and has excluded
illegally-taken evidence.38 In this light, Justice Morrison's application of the traditional notion seems quite arbitrary.
Prior to Long, the Montana Supreme Court applied the rules
of statutory construction to the provisions of the Montana Constitution. 9 The court also recognized that: "the Constitution must re30. See

V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972 at 1680 (1981).
31. See VI MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972 at 1852-53 (1981).
32. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33. Id. Adding such language implies that people will respect each other's rights, but it
is redundant. As Chief Justice Burger said, "rights ... carry with them certain responsibilities as well." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948 (1985)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
34. See Alderwood Associates v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243-45,
635 P.2d 108, 116-17 (1981).
35. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 559-60, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (1980).
36. See Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 269-70, 272, 103 N.E.2d 769, 777-78, 779
(1951).
37. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 159-60, 379 N.E.2d 1169,
1173-74 (1978).
38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. "The rules of statutory construction are equally applicable to interpretation of the
meaning of provisions in the Montana Constitution." State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson,
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ceive a broad and liberal interpretation consistent with the purpose of the framers and the people adopting it . . .."o The court
ignored both principles when it overlooked the intent of the people
in the privacy section. " The people could not have intended so
arcane an end as applying the right of privacy only to state actions
42
under an obscure jurisprudential notion.
The court in Long did great violence to a recurring theme in
Montana law. Where intent can be determined from the plain
meaning of words used, the court "may not go further and apply
other means of interpretation. ' 43 By ignoring the convention's deletion of the modifier, "the state," the court violated its mandate
"to ascertain and declare what in terms or in substance is contained in the statute [or constitution] and not insert what has
been omitted."""
Another point weighing against Justice Morrison's "traditional
notion" involves the problem of ambiguity. In Long, the court
found insufficient ambiguity "to require extensive perusal of the
constitutional transcripts.' ' 4 5 In other words, the court took the
160 Mont. 175, 184, 500 P.2d 921, 926 (1972); see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (construing state constitution provision as a statute). A traditional notion of construing the federal Constitution might not apply to a state constitution
construed as a statute.
40. Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 443, 543 P.2d 1323,
1329 (1975) (citing Arps v. State Highway Comm'n, 90 Mont. 152, 160, 300 P. 549, 553
(1931)).
41. Prior to the special election on approval of the new constitution, every state voter
received by mail a copy of a pamphlet entitled "Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of
Montana, Official Text with Explanation." This voter information brochure was required by
1971 Mont. Laws ch. 296 § 17(4). The privacy provision appeared on page 6, followed by an
explanation, thus: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. * * *
New provision prohibiting any invasion of privacy unless the good of the state makes it
necessary." The people of Montana approved the new constitution on June 6, 1972. Their
intent was clear. The privacy provision applies to any invasion of privacy, without distinction, but is subject to an exception: compelling state interest. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1824: "the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
42. The New York Supreme Court expressed a caveat that the court in Long failed to
observe: "It must be very plain, nay, absolutely certain, that the people did not intend what
the language they have employed, in its natural signification, imports, before a court will
feel itself at liberty to depart from the plain reading of a constitutional provision." Newell v.
People, 7 N.Y. 9, 97 (1852).
43. See, e.g., Montana Dep't of Social and Rehab. Serv. v. Angel, 176 Mont. 293, 296,
577 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1978).
44. Security Bank and Trust Co. v. Connors, 170 Mont. 59, 67, 550 P.2d 1313, 1317
(1976) (emphasis added).
45. Long, - Mont. at __, 700 P.2d at 157; cf. supra text accompanying notes 28-
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constitutional history lightly. But for more than ten years, the
court consistently construed the privacy section as applicable to
private actions; ambiguity is suggested by the reversal itself. The
court has not always been so hesitant to recognize ambiguity: "We
are mindful of the principle that when a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the
other against it, the former is to be adopted."'
Privacy is a natural right,"7 entitled to broad recognition and
application under a broad constitutional provision. Montana's constitutional right of privacy must apply to private actions.
B.

Private Action and the Exclusionary Rule

If the right of privacy rests in the constitution, three remedies
may be available to an accused whose privacy was invaded. First,
evidence taken in the invasion may be excluded under the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule was first applied in 1886 to exclude "compelled" evidence.' It was expanded in 1914 to exclude
evidence taken in violation of the fourth amendment; 4 9 in 1952 to
exclude evidence taken in violation of due process; 50 in 1961 to exto
clude from state courts evidence illegally taken;51 and in 1967
52
exclude evidence taken in violation of the sixth amendment.
Application of the exclusionary rule has been tempered by
such concepts as admitting evidence arising from an independent
source,53 purging the taint from the evidence, 54 inevitable discovery
despite the violation in the taking, 55 and, most recently, by a good
faith exception for evidence taken in a search where the warrant
was subsequently invalidated.5 6 Despite the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the rule remains under attack.57 While evidence
may be seen as neutral regardless of origin, the exclusionary rule
46. Cashmore, 160 Mont. at 185, 500 P.2d at 927.
47. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905).
48. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
49. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, (1914).
50. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
51. Mapp v. Ohio, 307 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
53. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969) (citing Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
54. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
55. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273 (1977).
56. See United States v. Leon, 464 U.S. 1015 (1984); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 464 U.S. 1034 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Ranney, The Exclusionary Rule-the Illusion vs. the Reality, 46 MONT.
L. REV. 289 (1985).
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arose because the other two remedies provided insufficient deterrents to illegal conduct, and the admission of illegally taken evidence casts a shadow upon judicial integrity.58
The second remedy available to the accused is the civil action.
While this remedy is available at common law, raising the right of
privacy to constitutional dimensions adds the potential force of a
constitutional tort. Constitutional tort actions against public officials and agents were recognized in 1971, 51 but Long renders such a
tort action irrelevant to invasions by private citizens.
Tort damages for trespass are normally based on loss in property valueY6 In Long, the trespass resulted in the loss of the value
of the contraband. Absurd as it may seem, forcing the trespasser to
pay for the lost value of the contraband, if it is not returned, would
create a deterrent and alternative to the exclusionary rule. 1 Nominal damages are no less absurd as an alternative to the remedy of
excluding evidence. Civil remedies, in any case, depend on the accused's ability to sustain a civil tort action while incarcerated.
Some will be unable either to post bail or to afford counsel, raising
equal protection questions about the civil tort remedy as a reasonable alternative.
The third remedy seemingly available to the accused is the
criminal trespass action. It is misleading to say that this is a remedy available to the accused. The state must bring such an action;
a citizen cannot. The state lacks incentive to bring an action
against its informers. For example, the state did not prosecute
landlord Hultgren, the trespasser-informer in Long. Failure to
prosecute represents a major failure of the alternatives to the exclusionary rule; failure to prosecute eliminates the deterrent effect.
Thus, there exists substantial cause to retain the exclusionary
rule as a remedy. In Long, the court stated that applying the exclusionary rule to the fruits of an illegal private search would not deter illegal conduct because the public lacks awareness of the rule:
"Private individuals are not schooled in the exclusionary rule and
most likely would be unaware of its application. Therefore, it
would not deter them from engaging in searches that would be illegal if conducted by government officials."6 2 The court simply con58. See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659-60.
59., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
60. See, e.g., Ostrem v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 648 P.2d 986, 990 (Alaska 1982).
61. The Montana Supreme Court has ordered the return of illegally taken contraband.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, 59 Mont. 600, 614, 198 P. 362, 367 (1921); cf.
State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 497, 530 P.2d 442, 448 (1974) ("[T]here could be no price
placed on a constitutional right."); but see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-304(2) (1985).
62. Long, Mont. at __,
700 P.2d at 157.
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fuses the trespass with the delivery of information. It is the trespass, the invasion of the right, that is illegal, and the deterrence
must go to the illegal act. Further, the court cited no authority to
indicate that the public is less aware of the exclusionary rule than
of any other rule or deterrent.6 3
Two other considerations illuminate the court's interpretation
of public understanding. First, public controversy has raised the
exclusionary rule to the status of a political issue, indicating some
public awareness of the rule. 4 Second, corporations may pose a
greater threat to privacy than individuals, and they can afford
counsel presumably schooled in the exclusionary rule. The American Civil Liberties Union has raised this second concern:
The greatest threat to society and to the privacy of individuals is
not the snoops and peeping toms referred to in our constitutional
debates. Rather, it is the threat imposed by large corporations
(who should know the rules) acting as quasi-governments in relation to their employees, to their customers, and to society in general. Indeed, in the past year Montana has seen repeated violations of privacy outside of the sphere of enforcement of the law.
Employers have, in the face of the right to privacy, required their
employees to bare their private lives in the context of a polygraph
examination. We have seen employers engage in unwarranted and
unannounced searches of their employees' persons and possessions. We have seen employers require (without telling their employees) urinalyses as a prerequisite to employment, to reemployment, or to continued employment. We have seen credit bureaus
gathering information about private citizens and storing it upon
their computers for the information of any interested party. We
have seen private companies gather information about tenants,
whether the information is correct or justified or not .... "
Considering the privacy violations outlined above, the court's
treatment of public awareness in Long is inaccurate. While violations by business interests seem to increase, the court struck down
the public's potential remedy.
63. Arguably, Thomas Jefferson would have disapproved of eliminating a rule of law
on the ground that people do not understand the remedy: "I know of no safe repository of
the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves, and if we think them not
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not

to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education."
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 93 (Dumbauld, ed. 1978).

THE POLITICAL WRITINGS

64. See, e.g., Court Upholds Rule Barring Illegally Obtained Evidence, Missoulian,
June 5, 1981, at 15, col. 2.
65. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Long,
- Mont. __,
700 P.2d 153 (1985)
(American Civil Liberties Union); see generally MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971).
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IV.
A.

199

DISCUSSION

Justice Morrison's Previous Opinions

This change in the law may have been anticipated. Justice
Morrison had consistently resisted application of the right of privacy to the acts of private citizens. For example, Justice Morrison
e7
had dissented in Hyem 66 and specially concurred in Van Haele.
In Hyem, private citizens entered a house under the guise of
being prospective buyers and searched under a bed, finding allegedly stolen skis. The state wanted the evidence admitted. It argued
the evidence should be suppressed, if acquired by a private citizen,
only when taken in an illegal manner, that is, when a criminal statute is violated. 8 The court suppressed the evidence because it
found the search unreasonable, despite the absence of a criminal
violation, since the invasion of privacy was an unlawful act. 9 Justice Morrison dissented, arguing that the constitutional right of
privacy does not protect citizens from other citizens, and that application of the exclusionary rule would not deter their illegal
actions.7"
Justice Morrison then modified his view by concurring in Van
Haele and essentially adopted the state's argument in Hyemr. 71 In
Van Haele, the manager of a rental storage business removed the
hingepins from a lessee's door and criminally entered it with an
intent to search the lessee's suitcases. 72 The court suppressed the
evidence under the exclusionary rule because it was taken in violation of the lessee's constitutional right of privacy and the lessee's
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Had the
manager been successfully prosecuted for criminal trespass, the
manager's crime would have been a misdemeanor.7 3
It is important to note that Justice Morrison concurred in the
Van Haele result, but not in the rationale. He reiterated his position that constitutional provisions and the exclusionary rule should
not be applied to private actions,7 4 but he argued that a third theory applied. Rather than premise exclusion of illegally taken evi66. Hyem, - Mont. at -, 630 P.2d at 210 (Morrison, J., dissenting).
67. Van Haele, 199 Mont. at 534, 649 P.2d at 1317 (Morrison, J., specially concurring).
68. Hyem,
Mont. at __,
630 P.2d at 206.
69. Id. at
, 630 P.2d at 206-07.
70. Id. at -,
630 P.2d at 210-12.
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. Van Haele, 199 Mont. at 524-25, 649 P.2d at 1312.
73. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-203 (1981).
74. Van Haele, 199 Mont. at 534-37, 649 P.2d 1317-19 (Morrison, J., specially
concurring).
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dence on the defendant's constitutional rights, Justice Morrison
argued that judicial integrity must be preserved "by not judicially
75
blessing the fruits of illegal activity.
B.

The Reversal

Long presented the court with evidence taken by a private citizen in a criminal trespass similar to that in Van Haele. In Long,
as in Van Haele, the trespasser was not criminally prosecuted.
Writing for the majority in Long, Justice Morrison blessed the
fruit of illegal activity, and6 the court held the evidence admissible
7
despite the misdemeanor.

C. Stare Decisis
Although the court in Long overruled thirty years of case history, no mention of stare decisis appears in the opinion. Justice
Weber discussed it in his concurrence. The court's omission raises
suspicion about the court's attention to the rule.
Justice Weber justified ignoring stare decisis in Long by relying on precedent that was not on point: "'The rule of stare decisis
will not prevail where it is demonstrably made to appear that the
construction placed upon the constitutional provision in the former
decision is manifestly wrong.' "7 Justice Weber refers to the precedential cases as "fundamentally mistaken. 71 8 He found the alleged

fundamental mistake in these cases to be the court's failure to acknowledge that the privacy provision of the Montana Constitution
79
does not expressly address private actions.
In abandoning Montana's case history of applying the right of
privacy to the illegal acts of private citizens, the court ignored the
principal tenet of stare decisis:
The highest appellate court of the state should stand by its decided cases and rely upon the people and the Legislature to take
care of any modifications deemed necessary to the law by reason
of any decisions by the Supreme Court construing or interpreting
the provisions of either the Constitution or statutes of the state.80
75. Id. at 537, 649 P.2d at 1318, quoted in Long, - Mont. at __,
700 P.2d at 158.
76. Long, Mont. at
, 700 P.2d at 158.
77. Long, - Mont. at
700 P.2d at 158 (Weber, J., concurring) (quoting State
ex rel. Sparling v. Hitzman, 99 Mont. 521, 525, 44 P.2d 747, 749 (1935)) (emphasis omitted);
but see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
78. Long, Mont. at __,
700 P.2d at 158 (Weber, J., concurring).
79. See supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
80. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 134 Mont. 526, 573, 335 P.2d
310, 334 (1959).
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Instances when the court has properly overruled its prior opinions
include those in which a prior decision deliberately ignored the
plain language of a statute;81 when the precedent relied on a sincediscredited foreign decision;8 2 when controversial precedent relied
on "no apparent controlling influence"; 8 and when the precedent
relied on a statute since amended. 4 No similar situation existed in
Long; the reversal accomplished there was arbitrary.
V.

A.

UNAPPLIED THEORIES

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

In its determination to sever from the constitution the right of
privacy against private invaders, the court overlooked an alternative theory under which it might have admitted the evidence
against the Longs. In 1967, in Katz v. United States,a5 Justice
Harlan noted that the right of privacy is constitutionally protected
if the defendant has an actual subjective expectation of privacy,
and that expectation is objectively reasonable.8 6 Certainly, the
Longs had a subjective expectation of privacy, or they would not
have kept 657 marijuana plants in their house. The state did not
raise the issue of whether this was an objectively reasonable
87
expectation.
Constitutional protection of the right of privacy could turn on
whether the landlord's placing himself in position to see the plants
was objectively reasonable. Under Montana law,88 where a lease
makes no provision for unpermitted entry, as in Long, the landlord
may enter in an emergency. Arguably, emergencies are not so rare
as to afford an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy for
657 marijuana plants that are in plain view when a door is opened.
The reasonableness question would turn on whether the landlord
81. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burns v. Lacklen, 129 Mont. 243, 254-55, 284 P.2d 998, 1004
(1955).
82. See, e.g., Sparling, 99 Mont. at 524-26, 530, 44 P.2d at 749, 751 (overruling State
ex rel. Kain v. Fischl, 94 Mont. 92, 20 P.2d 1057 (1933)); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (case not on point, Sparling, erroneously relied on in Long to abandon stare
decisis).
83. See, e.g., Sparling, 99 Mont. at 524-25, 530, 44 P.2d at 749, 751 (overruling Sanderson v. Bateman, 78 Mont. 235, 253 P. 1100 (1927)); see also supra notes 77, 82 and
accompanying text. The 1972 Montana Constitution controls in Long.
84. See, e.g. State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 126, 140-41, 314 P.2d 849,
852, 860 (1957).
85. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
86. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. The question appears neither in the state's Brief in Opposition to the Motion to
Suppress, nor in the Record of the hearing held October 19, 1983.
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-312(2) (1981).
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reasonably anticipated an emergency, without criminal investigative intent.
If Hultgren cloaked himself in the state's criminal investigative function upon illegally entering the Longs' house, the court
arguably should have found that the performance of the public
function requires that the illegal act of the volunteer informer be
treated as an act of the state.8 9 Further, an argument may be made
that the illegal act of the volunteer informer must be treated as an
act of the state regardless of the invader's state of mind regarding
the invaded party's potential criminal activity.
The district court rejected Hultgren's attempt to justify his
entry as an emergency and found him to be a trespasser.9 0 A court
could avoid applying the constitutional right of privacy to private
acts by appling the objective reasonableness standard.9 1 The Longs
had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when 657 marijuana plants filled a room, if the landlord entered under an objectively reasonable concern that an emergency existed.92 Hultgren's
89. Private persons sometimes provide criminal evidence to the state, and they are
encouraged to do so. For example, in Montana, "crimestoppers" is well on its way to becoming a household word. The impetus behind this recognition is the state's effort in encouraging citizens to inform the government about criminal activity. The state is promoting citizen
participation in the public function of criminal investigation. The state assures us that providing such information is the right thing to do. See supra note 13 and infra text accompanying note 105; cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-103 (1985) (ostensible agency defined).
Some citizens take this public function very seriously. See, e.g., State v. Helfrich, 183
Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979). In Helfrich, a citizen claimed to have seen contraband on
her neighbor's property, growing in a garden. She told police, who came and viewed the
garden as the informer viewed it. The police saw no contraband. After the police departed,
the citizen then trespassed upon the garden and took plant material alleged to be contraband. The incident demonstrates the zeal with which some citizens view their role in criminal prosecution. Another example of the state's encouragement of informers is protection in
the form of anonymity. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) ("The
privilege [of anonymity] recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation." (emphasis added)).
An illegal act of a volunteer informer should be treated as an illegal act of the state.
Where a court discriminates between classes of potential violators of constitutional rights, as
the Montana Supreme Court now does, so that the state's act is an invasion but the volunteer informer's same act is not, the court's discrimination is a state action appealable to the
United States Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 14-18, 21 (1948).
90. See Long, Mont. at , 700 P.2d at 158.
91. See supra text accompanying note 86. The standard of a reasonably objective expectation of privacy is unsettled. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741-42 n.5
(1985) (comparing Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981) and People v. Overton,
24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969) with State v. Engerud, 94 N.J. 331,
463 A.2d 934 (1983)).
92. In a similar situation, a landlord legally entered his rental property but then
opened a closet, which might be considered a privacy invasion. The landlord saw a light
coming from the closet and was "concerned that a lamp had fallen over and could constitute
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argument in Long, that a light left burning constituted an emergency, probably falls short of an objectively reasonable concern, especially when the Longs returned home every day. 3
This test, the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy,
was not discussed by the majority in Brecht, when evidence illegally acquired in a private invasion was first excluded. However,
Justice Castles raised only that issue in his dissent. 4 Did Brecht
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy against a woman who, in her own family home, on her own family extension
telephone, overheard his threat against her sister involving a
deadly weapon?9 5 If the threat had been leveled against a third
sister, would either of the first two have had a duty to warn? 6 In
Brecht, the court could have enunciated the right of privacy and
refused to apply it in the absence of a reasonable expectation.9
The parallel between Brecht and Long is the court's failure in
both cases to apply the reasonable expectation test. If this test had
been applied in either case, Montana's constitutional right of privacy between private persons would be secure today. Instead, that
right no longer exists.
B.

Criminal Investigation:A Public Function

Another theory unapplied in Long was the concept that a private citizen undertakes a public function when investigating suspected criminal activity. Long allows the admission of evidence
taken illegally by a private citizen, even though the evidence would
be excluded if so acquired by state action. This distinction began
in 1921, under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, when the United States Supreme Court admitted evidence
a fire hazard." State v. Sayers, 199 Mont. 228, 230, 648 P.2d 291, 292 (1982). This situation
met the court's test of an emergency. The trial court applied the objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy, and the Montana Supreme Court applied a similar rationale. Id. at
-,

648 P.2d at 292-93.

93. See Long, No. 83-233, Record at 27.
94. See Brecht, 157 Mont. at 273-76, 485 P.2d at 52-54 (Castles, J., dissenting).
95.

See id. at 269, 485 P.2d at 50.

96. In the light of cases limiting the right of privacy when death threats are expressed
to psychotherapists, Justice Castles' dissent is more convincing. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). The right
of privacy is not absolute, and a compelling state interest may exist in the protection of life
by private citizens. See also supra note 13.
97. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 ("[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of
his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
in original)). As well, the states have the right to interpret language in state constitutions
more strictly to protect a right than similar language is interpreted in the United States
Constitution. See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 n.4 (1975).
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acquired illegally by company employees and private detectives.9 8
That decision must be viewed in perspective. The Court did not
fully accept the constitutional right of privacy until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut,9 9 and the Court has not faced a question of
evidence taken in an illegal private search since Griswold.'0 0 Further, federal cases do not control Montana's judicial construction
of its state constitution; they may be relied upon for guidance or
rejected. 01' Rejection may be more likely when the law is unsettled.
Two arguments render the state of the law unsettled concerning application of the right of privacy against illegal searches. In
Illinois v. Andreas,03 the Court observed that "[tihe Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather
than simply places."' 0 3 Certainly, a legitimate expectation of privacy might arise against private invasions, particularly those occurring under the color of a criminal investigation. Secondly, in
United States v. Jacobsen"' the Court addressed private invasions
in dictum:
This Court has also consistently construed this [fourth amendment] protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is
wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the
the participation or knowledge of any govGovernment or with
10 5
ernment official.'

1

Most noticeably, the Court's use of the disjunctive, "or" invites the interpretation that a private individual may undertake a
function of the government as its agent without the knowledge of
98. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 473, 476 (1921).
99. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In that case, Justice Douglas wove together the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to recognize the right of privacy under the Constitution. Id. at 484.
100. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971), police lawfully entered
the Coolidge home and asked Mrs. Coolidge about guns. She produced them. In Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980), illicit films were lawfully in the possession of a third
party through mistaken delivery by a private carrier. The address on the package was sufficiently similar to that of the third party recipient to justify an opening of the package. In
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 767 (1983), the contraband was found in a customs search.
In United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984), employees of a private carrier observed
the contraband during a routine examination of a damaged package. None of the preceding
cases involved an illegal private search.
101. See Haas, 420 U.S. at 719 n.4; see generally Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d
442.
102. 463 U.S. 765.
103. Id. at 771.
104. 104 S. Ct. 1652.
105. Id. at 1656 (citing Walter, 447 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting and citing
Burdeau, 256 U.S. 465)); see also supra notes 13, 89 and accompanying text.
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any government official. Somewhat inconsistently, the Jacobsen
dictum is based solely on Burdeau v. McDowell, the 1921 case in
which company employees and private detectives illegally blew
open a safe to investigate alleged criminal activity.106
Equally important, the right of privacy has gained much stature since Burdeau. For example, in 1979, the California Supreme
Court excluded evidence taken in an illegal search by private security personnel. 10 7 The court noted that store detectives and security personnel have no more power to enforce the law than any
other private persons undertaking a public function in "bringing
violators of the law to public justice.' 10 8 The California decision is
salutary, as it represents a refusal to follow Burdeau. The dictum
of Jacobsen should not deter an appeal of a decision holding evidence admissible when it is taken illegally by a private person fulfilling a public function.
The Montana Supreme Court failed to discuss the public function test in Long. There was evidence in the record on which to
find that the trespassing landlord engaged in the public function of
investigating criminal activity. 09 This issue was not raised by defense counsel in Long. Like Jacobsen, Long should not deter an
appeal under the public function test. Defense counsel may invoke
the public function test under either the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution or the similar section of the Montana
Constitution."1 Defense counsel may argue that the decision to inform constitutes an assumption of a public function regardless of
whether the informer had criminal investigative intent upon discovering the evidence. But if the Montana Supreme Court applies
Montana's explicit constitutional right of privacy to invasions arising even from mistake or idle curiosity,"' as it should, then illegally taken evidence is excludable regardless of the public function
test."'1

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court found a right of privacy implicit
106. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 473.
107. See Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575.
108. Id. at 366, 594 P.2d at 1005, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 581; cf. supra note 89 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
110. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
111. See supra text accompanying note 1.
112. Cf. PruneyardShopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81 (The state may "adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution.").
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in the 1889 Montana Constitution and applied that right to intrusions by private parties. The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention adopted an express right of privacy, based on the existing
case law which was cited both in the Convention's circulated floor
documents and in the general floor debate. The people of Montana
ratified the 1972 Constitution containing a "[n]ew provision
prohibiting any invasion of privacy unless the good of the state
makes it necessary."' 3 For thirteen years the Montana Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the right of privacy applied against private
intruders.
In State v. Long, the Montana Supreme Court ignored stare
decisis and eliminated the constitutional right of privacy against
private intruders. This decision was unnecessary 14 and erroneous.
The Montana Supreme Court should enforce Montana's constitutional right of privacy, not explain it away.

113. See supra note 41.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 85-97. The district court might have held the
Longs for trial and admitted the evidence under the theory of reasonable expectation of
privacy. At this writing, the Longs had left the state and were unavailable for prosecution
on remand.
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